The Microsoft incident has had ramifications for organisations all around the world. But what are some of the legal issues it throws up?
Is personal data involved?
The first question for many if to ask is if personal data is likely to be involved. An incident can trigger a report to regulators under GDPR if personal data is involved even if the data is not compromised.
Across the EU, according to the European Data Protection Board (EDPB) Guidelines 9/2022 on personal data breach notification, making personal data temporarily or permanently inaccessible (such as through a ransomware attack or technical failure) qualifies as an availability breach under GDPR. A breach can exist if data is merely unavailable for a “not insignificant period of time”. Data does not have to be permanently lost or deleted to count as a breach. Some forms of planned maintenance may be exempt from this reporting requirement but it seems unlikely that these exemptions will apply here – even if it was an upgrade or patch which went wrong.
nThe time that systems are down will be important here as will the consequences – for example if the loss of access led to an important operation being cancelled that’s likely to be more significant than a marketing campaign being delayed.
In the UK, the guidance from the Information Commission’s Office (ICO) is similar. The ICO guidance defines a data breach as follows:
“A personal data breach can be broadly defined as a security incident that has affected the confidentiality, integrity or availability of personal data. In short, there will be a personal data breach whenever any personal data is accidentally lost, destroyed, corrupted or disclosed; if someone accesses the data or passes it on without proper authorisation; or if the data is made unavailable and this unavailability has a significant negative effect on individuals.”
What about NIS & NIS2?
There may be reporting obligations under the Network and Information Security Directive (NIS) in the UK or NIS2 in the EU.
Under NIS2 essential and important entities (which are defined in NIS2) must notify any incident with significant impact on their services to a competent authority or CSIRT (Computer Security Incident Response Team) without undue delay.
The European Commission’s implementing regulation (EU) 2024/2690 provides details on what constitutes a “significant incident”. Factors to consider include risk of death or health damage, financial damage, and length of time services are unavailable.
NIS2 provides multi-stage, tiered reporting deadlines:
- Within 24 hours of becoming aware of the incident: early warning
- Within 72 hours of becoming aware, an incident notification which includes an update on the early warning and an assessment of the incident
- Upon a request from a CSIRT or competent authority, an intermediate report with relevant status updates
- Within 1 month of the incident notification, a final, detailed report.
Our FAQs on NIS2 are here – The EU’s NIS2 Directive | Compliance Lawyers | London.
What about DORA & UK financial rules?
Financial services businesses may also have additional reporting obligations.
Under DORA financial entities must put in place and implement a comprehensive ICT business continuity policy, and associated ICT response and recovery plans and ICT business continuity plans.
As part of the overall business continuity policy, financial entities must conduct a detailed business impact analysis (BIA) of their exposures to severe business disruptions – this will include looking at third-party dependencies such as Microsoft services. ICT assets and ICT services must be designed and used in full alignment with the BIA – this will include looking at back-ups systems to cover critical components.
Financial entities are also required to test their ICT business continuity plans and the ICT response and recovery plans in relation to ICT systems supporting all functions at least annually.
DORA also includes requirements in relation to:
the reporting of major ICT-related incidents to competent authorities; and
sharing of information to clients without undue delay following a major ICT-related incident which has an impact on the financial interests of clients
It is important to remember that whilst DORA does not apply to the UK financial services sector (save for those UK entities that are also subject to the EU regime), operational resilience is a key priority for UK regulators too.
In many respects the UK regime is similar to DORA. In the UK financial services organisations must generally identify ‘important business services’ (defined differently in the FCA and PRA rules) that could cause ‘intolerable harm’ if disrupted. They should also have a strategy for internal and external communications to reduce the anticipated harm caused by operational disruptions.
Our FAQs on DORA and the equivalent UK regime are here EU DORA Regulation & Operational Resilience Requirements – Punter Southall Law.
Will insurance help?
Whether your insurance policies will cover you for any loss will likely depend on the policies which you have in place. It may also depend on the information you provided to your insurer to get cover. We have increasingly seen some insurers look carefully at policy proposal forms to examine the systems and processes disclosed after a claim for cover.
Practical tips on reducing the risk
No organisation is able to remove the risk from this type of failure but it can be reduced For many organisations running two email systems in parallel for example is impracticable. Some of the steps an organisation should consider are:
Rehearse incidents. Our experience tells us that when a team rehearses a realistic incident it is better when it comes to dealing with the real thing. We have helped many organisations prepare. Some organisations have found out for the first time today that they struggle without Microsoft systems – they were also unable to access key details like email addresses and phone numbers to try alternative contact channels. Regular, realistic rehearsals which include your regulatory response are key.
Debrief. There will be lessons to be learnt from this type of incident including having back-up communications channels. When the dust settles have a proper debrief, gather improvement actions and implement them. Outages may become more common given current world events and the reliance on technology. Learning and preparation is key.
Review your response times. Be ready to respond 24 x 7 x 365. This incident happened outside of office hours for many. Events developed quickly. You need to make sure you can match that pace. In our experience often the most significant events will take place on a Friday or over the weekend. There is a particular vulnerability over public holiday weekends. Your response plans will need to reflect that.
Review your reporting and resilience obligations. If for example you’re covered by NIS2 and/or DORA you’ll need to examine whether your business continuity plans were adequate.
Review contracts. Do you have reporting obligations which require you to report to your customers? Did your vendors tell you what was happening or where there lapses here? You might wish to review your contracts following the incident to check that contractual obligations have been met and to see if contracts can be improved.
Review any temporary measures you put in place. Some organisations resorted to alternative systems e.g. Gmail or WhatsApp. Those systems are unlikely to be as secure as your usual corporate systems. You may have obligations to ensure that any off-channel communications are now backed-up onto your authorised systems. Once things return to normal you may also want to reinforce the exceptional nature of this incident and the need to communicate on the organisation’s authorised systems. Regular training to reinforce these messages will be crucial given the issues many organisations are facing with Shadow IT and the use of unauthorised systems to do an organisation harm.
Prepare for DSR peaks. We’re already seeing significant rises in the number of data subject rights requests (SARs) under GDPR, including a rise in volume and complexity with subject access requests. Some individuals may use SARs to try and work out what data was held where and by whom, especially if they feel aggrieved after a service was denied to them due to the usage. Make sure frontline staff can recognise DSRs and that you have a process to respond to them.
Think about your reliance on AI. Some organisations have also struggled to use Copilot to manage AI tasks. You’ll need to make sure your organisation can still function without AI. This will include making sure that you still have the human skills needed to keep going. There’s a short film looking at some of the issues with AI displacement risk here https://youtu.be/EYQIllqIyY0.
Think about the future. There are some predictions that outages are more likely in future given limited data centre capacity, increased cyber threats and fuel supply issues. If incidents like this become more common how will that affect how you do business? If you are a listed entity do you need to review your public disclosures?
– Jonathan Armstrong, Partner, Punter Southall Law
More Stories
Coleg Cambria powers business growth and skills revolution across North Wales
Rapid Fusion fires up Prometheus launch with new international collaboration
Lawyer calls for action ahead of International Day to end Violence Against Women